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Taxation  in an intertemporal 
general equilibrium model of a 
small open economy 
D.P.  Broer and E.W.M.T.  Westerhout 
This paper presents a computable general equilibrium model of a small open economy, 
similar to the Auerbach-Kotlikoff model. Domestic and foreion goods are imperfect 
substitutes,  whereas  domestic  and foreign  assets  are  perfectly  substitutable.  We 
investigate  the effects of partial switches in the choice of tax base from  capital or 
wage income taxation to consumption taxation. It is found that reductions in capital 
income tax rates ma~' lead to less capital accumulation at home, even  though these 
reductions are welfare improving.  A  reduction o.f corporate income taxes gives best 
results in this respect.  Terms of trade effects generally dominate the e(ficieno' gains 
of a switch of tax base. 
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Since  World  War II the  view on the role of taxation  Goodhart  [ 11 ]).  This  strengthens  tax  competition 
in  the  performance  of  the  economy  has  changed  between  European  countries and  may induce  further 
fundamentally.  In  the  1950s  and  1960s  taxes  were  tax  harmonization,  limiting  the  extent  to  which  tax 
mainly  considered  as  an  instrument  of  demand  policies  can  serve  as  an  instrument  of  national 
management.  Nowadays  the  distortionary  effects  of  economic policy. Currently, the most topical example 
taxes  on  supply  and  demand  decisions  are  widely  is theharmonizationofvalue-added taxes (see Frenkel 
recognized,  and  the  tax  system  is  considered  an  et al [10],  Perraudin  and  Pujol  [18]),  but  the issue 
important  determinant  of  the  growth  potential  of  extends  to all  taxes  on  internationally  mobile goods 
economies,  and services. 
The  acceleration  in  the  process  of  European  lntertemporal generalequilibrium models in several 
integration  in  the last decade has been an important  ways provide a  suitable  instrument  for analysing  the 
factor  in  this  increase  in  interest  in  the  effects  of  impact of tax policies. These models explicitly consider 
different  modes  of taxation.  The  completion  of the  the  behaviour  of  economic  subjects  on  a  micro- 
internal market and the transition towards a monetary  economic level, and  they  incorporate  the  notions  of 
union  render  the  European  economies  increasingly  rationality  and  forward  looking  behaviour.  Because 
interdependent  (for a general assessment of EMU see  of  their  explicit  reliance  on  utility  maximization, 
general  equilibrium  models  allow  the  evaluation  of 
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Much  of  the  interest  in  the  long-term  effects  of 
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with  other choices of tax  base.  Summers considered  French  economy  by  excluding  imports  of  raw 
only  the  steady-state  effects,  however,  and  ignored  materials and investment goods from their model. 
possible  costs  of  transition  to  a  new  equilibrium.  This paper present a  general equilibrium model of 
Auerbach  and  Kotlikoff [2]  extended  his  approach  a  small  open  economy,  modelled  after  the  Dutch 
by  constructing  a  general  equilibrium  model  and  economy which extends existing general equilibrium 
incorporating  rational  expectations.  Auerbach  and  models  of  small  open  economies  in  a  number  of 
Kotlikoff  [3]  endogenized  labour  supply  and  respects. First, we include a fully developed model of 
accounted  for  installation  costs  of investment.  The  the  firm, with  an endogenous financial  structure,  as 
conclusion  that  can  be  drawn  from  these  models  in Auerbach [1 ]. This enables us to study the effects 
corroborates Summers's initial findings,  of changes in corporation based capital income taxes, 
These  analyses  all  apply  to  a  closed  economy,  as well as the effects ofcapital gains or losses on equity 
however,  and  their  conclusions  do  not  necessarily  by households due to unexpected tax changes. Second, 
generalize  to  an  open  economy.  First,  in  an  open  we  incorporate  imports  of  raw  materials  and 
economy  the  competitive  nature  of  international  investment  goods  in  the  model,  thus  increasing  the 
capital  markets  makes  domestic  interest  rate  move-  import content of domestic production and the effect 
ments largely exogenous. This removes the direct link  of changes in the terms of trade. Third, we attempt to 
between  savings  and  investment,  and  the  extent  to  make a step towards an analysis of an optimal change 
which the correlation between savings and investment,  in the tax structure by comparing balanced budget tax 
observed  by  Feldstein  and  Horioka  [9],  can  be  reforms with  tax  smoothed  reforms. We apply  these 
expected to exist also in a  world with perfect capital  elements  to  an  analysis  of the  relative  efficiency of 
mobility depends  inter alia on the substitutability  of  both  labour  income  and  several  forms  of  capital 
domestic  and  foreign  goods  (Bovenberg  [6]).  In  a  income taxation versus consumption taxation. 
small open economy the incidence of capital income  The structure of the  paper is  as follows. The next 
taxes may therefore fall entirely on labour, if arbitrage  section  discusses  the  modelling  of  the  household 
equates the net  rates of return at  home and  abroad,  sector, domestic firms, the government and the foreign 
Bovenberg [5],  however, points  out  that  with  costs  sector. The third  section discusses  the calibration of 
of adjustment,  existing  physical  capital  is  immobile  the  model.  A  number  of simulation  results  are  then 
between  countries,  so  that  after  tax  differences  in  presented, and the last section offers some conclusions. 
rentals affect investment flows only at a finite rate. A 
capital income tax therefore partly acts as a lump sum 
tax on existing capital, and the welfare effects depend 
on the transition  path.  The model 
Second, the treatment of capital income before taxes 
is  essential  information  to  solve  the  Harberger  The model  contains  a  domestic good  and  a  foreign 
incidence problem for an open economy. Most of the  good. Both commodities can be used for consumption 
studies dealing with this problem have assumed  that  as  well  as  investment.  There  are  four  sectors: 
the source principle applies, which equalizes net rates  households, firms, government and the foreign sector. 
of return.  However,  the  spread  of double  taxation  Households  have  fixed  finite  lives.  Every  period  a 
agreements leads to a  predominance of the residence  generation of households dies and  a  new generation 
principle  as  far as  interest  income is  concerned (see  is  born.  This  implies  that  at  any  time  there  exist 
Sinn [ 20] ). So, if the domestic capital stock is largely  several overlapping generations of households. These 
owned  by domestic residents, equality of gross rates  generations choose an optimal combination of goods 
of return of the capital stock across countries should  and  leisure  on  the  basis  of a  pure  lifecycle model 
result. This assumption is used by S6derlind [21], and  without  bequests.  This  specification  allows  us  to 
by Keuschnigg [16], who uses a two-country model,  examine the intergenerationai redistribution that may 
Third, as  pointed  out  by  Lipton and  Sachs  [17],  result from tax policies. 
with  heterogeneous  tradable  goods  terms  of  trade  Firms  produce  the  domestic  good  using  labour, 
effects becomeanimportant equilibriating mechanism  capital  and  imported  raw  materials,  subject  to  a 
that  may  transfer  part  of the  welfare  gains  of tax  constant  returns  to  scale  production  function.  The 
changes  to  foreign  countries.  This  point  was  capital good is composed ofdomestic as well as foreign 
investigated by Perraudin and Pujol [18] in a model  investment  goods.  Capital  formation  is  subject  to 
of the  French economy including both capital  flows  internal adjustment costs and is financed by retained 
and  foreign  goods.  Their  conclusions  are  not  earnings, issuing of debt and new shares.  Investment 
substantially  different  from  those  of Auerbach  and  and  employment are  determined  so  as  to  maximize 
Kotlikoff, but they underestimate the openness of the  the present  value of the firm. Ownership of the firm T~.vulion in an intertempora/ ~tem'ral equilihrium  model q~ a .~mal/ ~pen ev¢mOml":  1). P.  Brocr and 1=.. H ". il. l.  II "e~lerhou! 
is  assumed  to  be  purely  domestic.  We  include  the  and  equity  is  uniform over generations.  Let 
effects  of  corporate  taxation  in  the  model  by 
A (t, to ) =  value of assets of household ofgeneration 
distinguishing between corporate income tax, dividend 
taxation  and  interest  income  taxation.  The  financial  to 
structure is endogenous in our model through agency  .sa(to } =  share of generation  t o in  total  private 
costs. Capital costs are also affected  by the dividend 
policy  pursued  by  the  firm.  We  compare  the  wealth at t =  1,  ~  sh(r) =  1 
consequences of either of the existing views of dividend  , = 2 - r,. 
policy (Poterba  and  Summers [ 19]).  The composition of asset holdings  is given by: 
The government imposes taxes (wage taxes, capital 
income taxes, consumption taxes and profit taxes) and 
A(t, to) =  Dn{t, to) +  V(t. to)  (1) 
distributes  the  proceeds  as  interest  on  government 
debt, expenditure on domestic goods and transfers to  A(t o, to) =  0  (2) 
households. A possible budget deficit is bond financed 
and  subject  to  an  intertemporal  budget  constraint.  Dull  to) =  sh(to)Dn(I)  2 -- To ~< to ~<  I  (3) 
Interaction  with  the  foreign  sector  consists  of trade 
and  capital  flows.  The  capital  account  mirrors  the 
V(l,to)=Sh(to)V(1)  2--  7~<to~<  I  (4) 
current account and it involves only government debt, 
so that gross rates of return are equalized, according  and each household is subject to the following budget 
to the residence principle. The price of foreign goods  constraint: 
serves as numeraire. 
We  present  the  equations  for each  sector  in  turn,  ,, r-~  2 
and conclude with the market equilibrium conditions.  ~  Rh(r. t)  ~  p~,(r)ci(r, to) ~<  Wh(t, to)  (5) 
t'=/  i=O 
The household sector 
where  Wh  denotes  lifetime  wealth,  Co  is  the 
Households  are distinguished  by time of birth.  Each 
household  has  a  fixed,  finite,  lifetime,  lasting  To  consumption  of  leisure,  c;,  i=  1,  2,  denotes  con- 
sumption of good i, p,.,, is the price of leisure, p,., i =  1, 
periods, so that a  household  born in  period  to has a  2,  denotes  consumption  prices  and  Rn  is  the 
planning horizon of T =  To +  to -  t periods in period 
t.  Each  household  can  supply  an  amount  of labour  compounded  discount  rate" 
0 ~  1 ~  /max  per  period.  In  addition,  households  ,+r-~ 
receive income from their financial assets, that consist  Wh(t, to} =  ~  Rh(r, t)(pc,,(r)/max  +  Tf(r,  to)) 
t=t 
of bonds  D u  and  equity  of domestic  firms  V.  it  is 
assumed  that  both  assets  are  perfectly substitutable  +  A(t, t o)  (6) 
and  offer the same rate of return  r H.  The last  source 
of  income  is  lump  sum  transfers  made  by  the  Rh(r,t)=_~](l~  +  rH(S)) -1  (7) 
government,  Tf.  The  decision  problem  for  the  ~=, 
household  is to find  a  utility maximizing plan for its 
supply of labour and consumption of the domestically  Co ( t, t o ) =-- lm~ x  --  1( t,  t o )  (8) 
produced good and the imported good, subject to the 
lifetime budget  constraint.  To avoid secular  shifts  in  p¢o(t)  =-- (1  -  tt(t))p~(t)  (9) 
labour supply in the face of steadily rising real wages, 
it  is  assumed  that  the  preference  for leisure  declines  p~,(t) =  (1  +  t~(t))pg(t)  (10) 
over generations  at  the  same  pace  as  labour  saving 
technical progress.~  In addition it is assumed that the  t,. is an indirect tax rate, levied on consumption goods 
preference  for  leisure  of each  individual  household  on a  producer  prices  basis.  The net  return  on  assets 
grows  with  its  age.  We  do  not  assume  any  bequest  r u  consists  of the  after tax  real  interest  rate,  r,  plus 
motives, so that households start without any financial  the  change  in  domestic  prices,  against  which 
assets,  and  leave  no  financial  assets  upon  their  government bonds are indexed: 
decease.  Households  born  before  period  t =  1  have 
already  accumulated  some assets  at  t =  1,  however,  rn (t) =  ( 1 -- t k (t) ) (r (t) +  n i (t) )  ( I I ) 
We assume that the initial distribution of both bonds 
n~(t)=pi(t+  l)/p~(t}-  I  i=  1,2  (12) 
The alternative would be to assume complete separability between 
leisure and consumption: see King, Plosser and Rebelo [ 15].  ~:2  is  the general  rate of inflation  and  n~  the change 
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in the real exchange rate. The utility function is time  {  pc(r)  "~-o, 
separable and weakly separable in leisure and the two  c* (r, to) =  ~  j  u* (t, to)  (21) 
consumption goods : 
O~  -  '--  c*(r, to)  i=  I  2  (22)  ~  (1  +fl)'-'  c*(r't°)=  p~(r)  '  U(t, to)=  l- 
x  U(Co(t, to),Cl(t,  to),cl(t,  to)) 1-t/~  It appears  from  Equation  (19)  that  consumption  is 
only homogeneous in full income if the household does 
(7 >  0)  (13)  not  plan  to  retire  from  the  labour  market  (in  that 
u(co, cl, c2)  case, It(t, to) is identically zero in t). 
=  [0o(co(l  +  ~t),o( 1 +  v),O-t)-pl  + c-p~]-t/o,  Aggregate consumption, labour supply and transfers 
can  he  found  by  aggregating  over  all  existing 
(14)  households" 
c =  [01c-~ p2 +  02c~°2] -t/p~  (15)  c*,(t) =  S"  ,qen(z )c* (t, t)  (23) 
t=t-To+  t 
is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ct is the 
preference drift away from  leisure  over  households,  ± 
and  v  is  the  preference  shift  towards  leisure  for  U(t)=  ~  gen(z)(l,,~-c*(t,r))  (24) 
an  individual  household.  The  household  seeks  a  ,=t-r,,+t 
maximum of Equation (13) with respect to Co, Cl, c2, 
subject  to  the  budget  constraint  (5)  and  the  Tf(t)=  ~.  9en(z)Tf(t,t)  (26) 
leisure constraint c  o (t, to ) ~< lm~. Denote the discounted  , =, - ro + t 
shadow price of leisure by #(,, to). Define 
where  gen(t)  is  the  size  of  generation  t.  Total 
p*o(t, to) =  p(z, to) +  p¢o(Z)(1 +  a)-'°(l  +  v) '-'°  population is equal to 
(16) 
t 
Pop(t) =  ~  9en(r)  (26) 
0'2  02  till  par)  =  [01  p~,(t) t-°'  +  0~ p,,(T) ~-°']  -°2~  ,=,-~,,+1 
( 17 )  Firms 
p*(z, to) =  [0~'P*o(t, to) 1  -"' +  p,(t) 1  -"'] 1¢(1 -,,~)  There is one representative firm in the model, which 
uses  raw  materials  M,  capital  K  and  labour  L  to 
(18)  produce one homogeneous good y. The capital good 
is  a  composite  of  domestic  investment  goods  and 
where  tr~ =  1/(1  +  p~), i =  1, 2  are  the elasticities of  imported investment goods. Production is subject to 
substitution  between  leisure  and  consumption,  and  internal  adjustment  costs  on  gross  investment  (l). 
between consumption of the two goods respectively.  Input  markets,  the  output  market  and  the  capital 
The  optimal  consumption  plan  of households  is  as  market  are  perfectly competitive.  Financing of new 
follows"  investments can be done either by issuing new shares, 
(p,(t,  to )  Rh(r_,t)  ~-'~  by issuing debt, or by using internal funds. The use 
tl* ( T, to ) =  of debt entails a principal-agent problem, because of  \ 
(1  +  fl)t-'J  .  possible conflicts of interest between bondholders and 
r +~-,  ~  shareholders. Shareholders may be induced to adopt 
Wh(t, to) +  ~  i~(s, to)Im,~Rh(s, t)  riskier investment projects if the firm is  / 
more highly 
x  leveraged.  We  assume  that  this  leads  to  a  loss  of  r+~?  ......................  1 
(p*(s, to)Rh(s,t))l-y(1  +fl)-y(~-')]  efficiency in the aggregate, because a brankruptcy may 
~=,  ]  involve  a  loss  of productive  capital,  as  the  capital 
(19)  goods cannot be freely reallocated to new activities in 
the face of adjustment costs. We therefore assume that 
/  *  r  "~-~  a  higher  debt-equity  ratio  induces  a  higher 
c~(z, to)  (1  +  ~)-'°(1  +  v)t-'°O~ 'l Pco(  , to  =  /  depreciation  rate  of capital.  An  alternative  way  to 
k,p*-~,to)/  model  agency  costs  is  given  in  Auerbach  [1]  and 
x  u*(r, to)  (20)  Hayashi  [13].  In  these  models  the  borrowing  rate 
'l~f'~4"~l~.Tf~ll/l'|f'~  Nt,414"~11"~1"~I  •  "II'I~T4"~  • ........  t  ,-,~/~-i  __ fdVallOn  ill ~lll illlcrlcmpora/  ~lcPwral  cquilit>rium mode/o~ a  ~ma// op('n ccom,m'.  D.P.  Brocr am/k.. If ..ll.  1.  I1 c.~/('rhm~t 
increases  with  thc  leverage  of  the  firm.  In  a  model  dz  =  1.."( 1 +  Pt )  (41) 
without  uncertainty,  the  risk  premium  thai  is 
associated  with  this  higher  borrowing  rate  must  be  C(I/K)=  ~c,11..K  (42) 
compensated  for by' a  real  cost,  in  terms  of a  loss  of 
resources,  however,  We choose  to  model  this  cost  as  6(b)  =  6 o +  ~-c'bb  e  (43) 
a  loss of capital goods. The firm maximizes its market 
value, subject  to an arbitrage  condition  for its  rate of  FI denotes  the  profits  of the  firm,  T b corporate  taxes. 
return.  The  model  is as follows"  Div the dividend  payout, B  the amount  of debt, r a the 
rate of return, t a the tax rate on dividends, t,. the capital 
kr,,j/(~'((tt)'~  gains tax, and  V the present  value or market  value of 
3'[ t ) =  F{ M ( t ), K ( t ), L ( t ), t ]  -  C  I (t  the firm. VN denotes issues of new shares. It is assu reed 
27}  that  repurchasing  of shares  by the  firm  is  prohibited 
(Equation  (32)).  The  production  structure  incor- 
H (t)  =  P  l  (t)ytt  )  -  p,,,(t )M (t) -  Pt(t )L (t)  porates weak separability of raw materials from capital 
and  labour  (Equations  (37),  (38)).  Accumulation  of 
-(r(t)+  ~t (t))B(t)  28)  new  capital  goods  incurs  adjustment  costs  through 
production  losses (Equation  (27)).  Capital  goods are 
an amalgam of domestically produced goods (I~) and 
"l'h( t ) =  thI t )  Hit)  -  ~  c'rl t )p~( t ) l~( t )  imported investment goods (1,)(Equation  (33)). The 
i=l  . 
2  depreciation  rate  depends  on  the  leverage  ratio  hie 
~  S(t-  r)p,(~)li(r))  (29)  theratioofdebtversusthereplacementvalueofcapital 
= ~ , ~, - 7,, +,  (Equation  (43)).2  The  economic  depreciation  rate  6 
may deviate  from  the  depreciation  scheme  of capital 
2  for  tax  purposes,  S(.),  used  in  Equation  (29).  Oiv(t)=  H(t)-  Th(t)--  ~  p~(t)li(t) 
~=,  Financing of investment expenditures through internal 
funds is restricted by a pay out condition on dividends 
+  B(t  +  1) -  B(t)  +  VNIt)  (30)  (Equation  (31)).  Debt  is issued  as one-period  bonds 
at  a  real  interest  rate  of r(t).  Equation  (36)  defines 
Die(t)  >~ z(l-I(t) -  7~,(t)  -  pt(t)6(b(t))K(t))  the  rate  of  return  to  the  firm's  assets.  The  rate  of 
(31)  return  on equity  is linked  to the  net  return  on  bonds 
via an  arbitrage  condition" 
VN(t)  >~ 0  (32) 
rd(t)  = rn(t)  (44) 
l(t)=  G[l~(t),12(t)]  (33) 
Forward  solution  of Equation  (36)  yields  Equation 
K(t+  1)=  l(t)+  (I-6(b(t))K(t)  (34)  (45): 
h(t)=B(t)/(pt(t)K(t))  (35)  V(t)=  £  R,(z,t){l-td(rJDiv(r)-VN(z)) 
,=,  1  t,.(~) 
r~(tiV(t)  =  (1  -  td(t))Div(t)  (45) 
+(1  --t,.(t))(V(t  +  I) 
-  V(t)-  VNit))  (36)  Ry(r,t)-=.=  1 +  I  -t~.(s)J  (46) 
F[M,K,L,t] 
=  ((,,M -°h + (hH[K,  L, t]-°") -z'p~  (37)  For foreign investors, the net return on financialclaims 
deviates  from  that  of domestic  investors  if tax  rates 
H[K, L, t]  =  ((k K-o"  +  (t(L exp(~t)) -P-~)- '"P~  differ and if the residence principle of taxation applies, 
as we assume.  This  implies  that  foreign  stockholders 
(38)  discount  future  revenues  differently  from  domestic 
investors, which would create a problem of shareholder 
G[Ix,12]  =  (Ttl[P'+  7212t") -I'p'  (39)  unanimity  if  foreign  investors  were  to  invest  in 
pl(t ) =  (71~rlPl(t)l-*~,  +  72~,pz(t)l-o,)l.'tl-~,,) 
" An alternative would be to use the debt  .equity ratio, as in Hayashi 
(40)  [ 13]. We refrained from doing that for computational reasons. Taxation  in an in tertemporal 9eneral  equilibrium  model ¢?f a small open economy.  D.P. Broer and E. W.M.T.  Westerhout 
domestic firms. To avoid this, we assume that foreign  also  depends  on  the  mode  of finance.  Suppose,  as 
investment is only in bonds (see section below on the  usually, that to ~< te and (1  -  tk)/(l  -  to) <  1 -  tb. It 
foreign sector),  then follows from the first-order conditions that there 
The firm seeks a  production and  investment plan  are three financing regimes, ranked by increasing costs 
that  maximizes  its  market  value.  The  first-order  ofdebt (for a similar result in a slightly different model, 
conditions for this problem are presented in Broerand  see  Auerbach  [1]  and  Hayashi  [13]).  In  the  first 
Westerhout [7]. Since labour and  raw materials are  regime, investment is financed by retained profits and, 
flexible  inputs,  their  marginal  product  equals  their  for a growing firm, debt issues ()'D  --'~  0,  /]'B  =  (l  --  td)/ 
market  price.  For  investment,  we  can  derive  the  (I  -  t,.)).  In  the  second  regime, retained  profits are 
following q-theoretic relation :  exhausted and the firm uses debt as the sole marginal 
source of funds (20 =  2 a -  (1  -  td)/(1  -- to), (1  -- tn)/ 
I(Z)  (I  -- t~.) <  )-B <  l)). In the third regime, the costs of  c, k(~-) =  [q(r) -  2,(r)/p,(r)]/ 
debt have risen sufficiently to make equity finance a 
viable option, and the firm uses both debt and equity 
[(,;~s(z) -  ~2o(~))(1 -  tb(z))pl(z)/pt(z)]  (47)  as  means  of  additional  financing  ()-n--l,  ~o-- 
where  1 -  (1  -  td)/(1  -  t,,)).  Debt  financing  will  therefore 
always  be one of the  sources of funds.  It derives its 
attractiveness  from  the  higher  rate  of  taxation  of 
q(z)  =  2x(r)/pt(z  )  (48)  corporate  profits  as  against  interest  income  (which 
defines  the  rate  of  return  in  Equation  (44)).  The 
).l(z)  =  Pt(Z)[).n(z)  -  (28(z) -  ~)-o(~))  optimal debt-capital ratio is determined by" 
x  tb(z)(cr(z ) + dew(z))]  (49)  6'(b(z)) 
2x(t)  ~  (  =  ;tn(z-  1)  !+  1-to(-~) 
=  ~  '~(~.B('c)-  ~/.o(T))(l  -  tt,(T))  -  O.B('r)  -  x;.o(r)) 
r=t+  1  k 
×(  bF\dK(z)+\K(z)j(l(z))2C,(~_[,~))+pt(z)b(z)  ×(l+(l--tb(r))(r(z)+n'(t'))--2n(z)}/ 
x  2a(r-  1)  1 +  1 -to(Z)J  lf;t.(T) =  2n(z-  1)and2D(r ) =  O, the term between 
braces can be simplified. In that case, it follows that 
1 -  tb(r))r(z))~  B(z)  >  0 if f(l -  t,)/(1  -  to) >  (1  -  t.).  28(r )(1  +  ( 
J  It  is  also  possible  to derive a  q-theoretic relation 
between  the  marginal  value  of  capital,  q,  and  its 
+  Xpt(r)2n(z)(6(b(z))  +  (1  -  tb(z))r(z)b(z)  average value, Q, for the leveraged firm. Define 
(1-6)'-'Rf(~,t)  (50)  t-1  2  v,,(t)  =  ~  ~  p,(~)t,(r) 
Investment is positive if the marginal value of capital  ,=,-to+ t ~= 
(2x) is larger than its net cost of purchase (2~). The  ,+ ro- 
marginal value of capital consists of, first, the present  ~  2n(s)tb(s)S(s  -  z)Rf(s  -  1, t) 
$=t 
value of the increase in production resulting from an 
additional  unit  of capital.  This  unit  of capital  both  (52) 
increases gross production and diminishes adjustment  (  l_Q(tlB(t))/(p,(t)K(t)  ) 
costs. Second, thereductionintherateofdeterioration  Q(t)  =  v(t)  +  1  to(t 
caused by the lower leverage resulting from a  larger 
capital base can be expressed in terms of the interest  (53) 
rate difference of retentions (rd) and debt ((1  -  tb)r),  then 
Finally, the  third  term in  (50) represents the  return 
toa  relaxation  of the  dividend  payout  restriction,  (t+.l)~  VD(t+I)  } 
caused by higher depreciation deductions and interest  q(t ) -  p~  Q(t +  1 ) -  - 
payments.  The  shadow  price  of debt  (;tn),  used  to  pt(t)  (  pl(t  +  1)K(t +  1) 
value  marginal  returns  to  investment  in  (50),  (54) 
Ir~ae'~Jt'~rAr'~tmllt~  iml"~lr~TMr  •  I-,  r  .~  •  T~r  _ _ Taxati~m  in an  intertcmpm'al  ~tencrul equi/ihrium  ram~el o~ a  ~mall  open  ecom,m~  :  D.P.  th'ocr  am/E.  I I ..tL T.  I! c.~/crhm~l 
(see  Broer  and  Westerhout  [7]  for  a  derivation ).  /. =  0), h* and p~ are independent of,;.B and therefore 
Equation  (54)  restates  the  result  of  Hayashi  [12]  themarginalsourccoffinanceaffectscapitalcostsonly 
relating marginal q to Tobin's average q for the case  through  the debt- capital  ratio h*.  This  implies  that 
of a  partially debt financed firm.  Note the difference  dividend taxes have no effect on capital  costs or the 
in timing, which results from the fact that investment  capital  stock.  The  corporate  tax  rate  influences 
results in additions  to the capital stock  with a  lag of  capital costs both because investment is generally not 
one period,  fully deductible against  profits, if cr  +  depr  <  I. and 
Additional  insight  into  the impact  of the  financial  because it acts upon the financial structure of the firm, 
structure  on  capital  costs  can  be obtained  from  the  by changing  the desired debt- capital  ratio• A  higher 
steady-state solution of the model. In a steady state the  amount of debt lowers after tax capital costs, and will 
real  growth  rate  (~,),  the  tax  rates  and  the  rates  of  induce  the  firm  to  choose  a  higher  level  of capital 
inflation are constant (n 2 =  nl  =  n). The steady-state  intensity than it would  in a  world without debt, The 
relations are:  total  impact  of corporate  taxation  on  investment  is 
therefore  ambiguous.  The  conditions  under  which 
,:.* =  (1  -  td)/(1  -- t,,) +  2*  (55)  corporate taxes do not affect the user costs of capital 
are cr  +  depr  =  1 (full deductibility of depreciation), 
(2*  -  1 )VN*  =  0  (56)  c z =  0, 2 o =  0, and b -- 0  (no debt finance). 
The  consequences  of  the  financial  structure  for 
2*(Div*  -  Z(H*  -  T*  -  p~f*K*))  =  0  (57)  investment decisions also depend on the treatment of 
dividend payments. We distinguish the following cases 
;t*  =  Pr* (zn'* -  ().~  -  Z2*)tb(cr  +  depr* ))  (58 )  (see Poterba and  Summers [19]): 
2*=(2~'+(2*-Z).o)(l-tb)p*cz(~k+6(b*)))  (59)  (i)  Z=0"  this  case  represents  the  new  view  of 
dividend  taxes, where the  timing of dividends is 
=  zr/pt  (60)  not  important,  because  only  their  capitalized 
value matters.  It follows from (66) that the level 
q  of  dividend  taxes  does  not  distort  investment 
6'(h*)  2*  1 -  tk  (2*  " "*  =  -  -  Z/'D)  1  --  tn)J  decisions, to that  there is  no problem of double 
1  t,.  taxation  (of  course,  intertemporal  substitution 
• (r*  +  zt* )/(q*  -  ~2~)  (61)  caused by expected changes in dividend taxes may 
still lead to a  loss of efficiency). 
I*  =  K*(~p  +  6(b*))  (62)  (ii)  7. >  0:  this  case  represents  the  classical  view, 
where the firm is compelled to maintain a stable 
,{i?F  I  flow  of  dividend  payments  eg  to  signal  its 
P' ~,~-K  -  lc'(~b  +  6)2/=  p*  (63)  profitability.  In  this  case,  if  the  restriction  is 
binding (2 >  0), dividend taxes do distort capital 
OF  costs•  This effect is  represented  by  the  separate 
p* ~,~ =  p,,  (64)  role  of the  shadow  price  of dividends  in  (66). 
which depends positively on the dividend tax rate 
td,  and enters marginal investment costs (2 t ). 
p* ~£ =  p*  (65)  Of course,  dividend  taxes  will  in  any case  influence 
the  market  value  of  the  firm  and  thereby  asset 
where p* is the equilibrium user price of capital:  positions of households. 
........  +  6(b*  )  -  I  The  .qovernmem 
1  +~* 
Government  behaviour  is  largely  exogenous  in  the 
1--tk  /  model.  The  restrictions  imposed  are  that  the  b*(r*+ re) 
)'~ ]-~,t.  -()'~-Zj'~9)(I~- --to)/  government adjusts  its taxes or expenditure to meet 
/  its  budget  constraint  and  that  it keeps the  real  level 
-  z6(b*)2~  /{(2* -  ,~2~)(1  -  fl,)}  (66)  of per capita transfers constant. We also assume that 
government consumption consists of domestic goods 
Note that the net interest rate on debt appears in this  only. The accumulation of debt of the government is 
equation with a  weight equal  to the leverage rate.  If  the difference between expenditure and  income plus 
dividend  payments  are  not  restricted  (2o =  0  or  nominal capital gains as a  result of the indexation of 
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debt on the domestic price level :  tax rate of interest. The second option that we consider 
is  that  the  government  reacts  to  fluctuations of its 
D(t+l)=D(t)+G(t)+Tf(t)  deficit  by  choosing  a  constant  level  of  its  tax 
+ (r(t) + rt I (t))D(t) -  Tr(t)  (67)  instruments, such that real debt per capita is constant 
in the steady state: 
where G (t) is government consumption and Tr ( t ) are 
total tax receipts"  lim (D(t +  1 )/D(t) -  Pop(t +  1 )/ 
1~oc 
Tr(t)=  Tb(t) + h(t)pt(t)L(t)  + tk(t)r(t)  Pop(t)ps(t  +  l )/pl(t))=O  (72) 
DH(t ) + B(t) + tk(t)Div(t) 
This represents a  policy of tax smoothing, where the 
+  t,,(t)( V(t +  1 ) -  V(t) -  VN(t))  government deficit may deviate from zero in the short 
{~  }  run (Barro  [4] ). Though the general conditions for 
+  1~+  tc(t)tc~t)  i=1 Pc'(t)ci(t)+Pcl(t)g(t)  uniformtaxationgivenbyDeaton[8]arenot satisfied 
over time in this model, it is still plausible that a policy 
(68)  aimed at avoiding the excess burden of intertemporal 
substitution is welfare improving. Long-run debt per 
where  9  denotes  the  volume  of  government  con-  capita,  and  indeed the  position  of the  steady state, 
sumption.  Real  transfers  per  capita  (Tv)  are  depends on the transition path. 
exogenous, nominal transfers are given by: 
Tf(t) =  Tv(t)Pop(t)Pl (t) 
The foreign sector 
The intertemporal budget constraint requires that the 
By analogy with the model for domestic consumers, 
present value of government debt be zero eventually : 
we assume that goods produced at home and abroad 
are imperfect substitutes. We do not explicitly consider  z 
lira D (t)  1-'I (r (r) +  pl (r +  1 )/p 1  (z))- 1 =  0  the choice problem for foreigners but simply assume 
, .... ~  that foreign demand for domestic goods is given by" 
Using this condition leads  to  the following forward  e(t) = eo(t)(pl(t)/p2(t))  -~  (73) 
solution of Equation (67) : 
As  we  shall  see  below,  this  formulation  has 
D(t) +  Rg(z, t)(G(z)  +  Tf(T))  implications for welfare analysis, similar to those of a 
~='  monopoly. Note however that domestic firms cannot 
exploit this monopoly, but sell at  marginal costs to 
=  Rg(z,t)Tr(z)  (69)  domestic  consumers  and  foreigners  alike.  The 
where  accumulation of foreign claims on the home country 
is determined by the current account: 
p (s  + 
Ro(z,t)-  fl~=,  r(s)+  ~(-~)  J  (70)  A~(t+l)=p2(t)(c2(t)+12(t))--pl(t)e(t  ) 
The government chooses a  time path of one or more  +(r(t)+P1(-t+-,l)~A~(t)  (74)  p~ ~t)  / 
of its instruments to satisfy Equation (69). This choice 
is exogenous in the model. We consider two special  (r(t) +  Pl (t +  1 )/pz (t))A,(t)  is net factor income to 
cases  of Equation  (69)  in  the  simulations, the  first  foreigners  under  the  residence  principle  of  income 
being that the government adjusts one of its taxes so  taxation. It is assumed that foreigners invest only in 
as to maintain a constant real debt per capita:  government  bonds,  so  that  factor income does  not 
include dividend payments. The budget constraint of 
D(t +  l) =  D(t)Pop(t  +  1 )/Pop(t)px (t +  1 )/Pl (t)  the foreign country is again given by a  transversality 
(¥ t >/ 1)  (71)  condition : 
This rule satisfies the budget constraint provided that  lim A,(t )  fl  (r( z ) + p~ ( z +  1 )/Pt ( z ) ) = 0 
the growth rate of the population is less than the before  , .... 
l~f'Idr~lt'h.td'~lk/i'I/"~  'm, hlf~ltl"%l~  T  •  ll'l~Tf'~  •  ........  lt~ta'~"~  ~ J'~lAalio/1  ill till inlertem/~ortl/.qetlo',t/  equilibrium  mode/o/a  .~ma// opetl e~on~mll.  /).P.  BrtJcr alld I:./I ..~./. 7.  11 "c.~/cr/l~q~l 
which results in the following intertemporal restriction :  The valucs of thc exogenous variables arc 
~  R~(r,t)p,(r)e(r)-A,,(t)  P2  =  1.0  p,,=  1.0  eo =9.4  r.=0.055 
r=t 
.q=  60  cr =0.0  t~=0.35  t,  =0.25  x 
= ~  Ro(r,t)(p2(r)(ce(r)+  12(r)))  (75)  t 1=0.25  ta=0.25  t k =0.25  t, =0.0 
r=t 
gen =0.5  t]J =0.01 
Equilibrium  To  investigate  the  consequences  of  changes  in 
Market equilibrium  is given by  government policy wc compute the effects of changes 
in  a  number  of instruments  on  the  solution  path  of 
L(t) = U(t)  (76)  the  model,  in  deviation  from  the  initial  steady-state 
y(t)=ca(t)+l~(t)+g(t)+e(t)  (77)  path. To allow for convergence to a  new steady state, 
we solve the model for 200 periods, in which case the 
A(t) + A~(t) = V(t) + B(t) + D(t)  (78)  terminal  values are  within  a  few percent  of the  new 
r(t)+p~(t+  1)/p~(t)=r~(t)+p2(t+  l)/p2(t )  equilibrium and thecut offpoint has a negligible effect 
on the solution  in  the first 60 periods. 
(79) 
Equation  (76)  defines  labour  market  equilibrium,  Results 
Equation  (77)  equilibrium  on  the  domestic  goods  In this section  we investigate the effects of switching 
market,  Equation  (78)  defines  equilbrium  on  the  from various forms of income taxation to consumption 
domestic  bonds  market  and  Equation  (79)  is  the  taxation. The discussion of whether to tax income or 
arbitrage  condition  for  the  international  capital  expenditure is an old one (for a survey, see Kay [ 14]). 
market  under  the  residence  principle  of  taxation.  In a  lifecycle perspective, a  capital income tax puts a 
Claims of residents  on  the  government  are given  by  burden  on future consumption,  while a  consumption 
A(t)-V(t)  and  claims  of  foreigners  on  the  tax  or  a  wage  tax  places  the  burden  on  current 
government by A~ (t).  if A~ (t) <  0, this is interpreted  consumption.  Thus  capital  income  taxation  distorts 
as  domestic  holdings  of foreign  bonds.  One  of  the  the choice between consumption  in different  periods, 
Equations  (76)-(79)  is redundant  by Walras's law.  while consumption and wage taxes distort  the choice 
between  leisure  and  consumption  per  period.  The 
Simulation procedure  relative  efficiency  of  the  various  tax  regimes  will 
depend on the supply elasticities of labour and savings 
In  the  absence  of  analytical  solutions,  we  have  to  and on the size of the relevant tax base. Based on the 
perform  numerical  simulations  to  investigate  the  results  of  Auerbach  and  Kotlikoff,  the  general 
consequences  of  various  tax  policies.  This  requires  presumption  would  be that  consumption  taxation  is 
choosing  parameter  values  and  values  for  the  more efficient  than  wage taxation  and  that  a  capital 
predetermined  variables.  Crucial  parameters such  as  income  tax  is  least  efficient.  As  pointed  out  in  the 
substitution elasticities have been assigned values that  introduction,  this  conclusion  may need  modification 
agree  with  estimates  in  the  literature  (for a  detailed  in case of an open economy. Furthermore, in a  model 
discussion  of the  calibration  procedure  we  refer  to  that  includes  financial  aspects  of  investment,  the 
Broer  and  Westerhout  [7]).  Scale  parameters  and  various forms that  capital  income  taxation  can  take 
exogenous variables are chosen  in a  way that  makes  may influence its efficiency ranking. 
the initial steady-state solution of the model resemble 
the Dutch economy as closely as possible around the  Wage taxation 
year 1989.  Due to the stylized nature of the model this 
attempt can only be partially successful eg unempioy-  The first measure we analyse is a reduction in the wage 
ment,  government  employment,  and  foreign  direct  tax  rate  (tt),  financed  by an  increase  in  the  indirect 
investment  are  excluded  from  the  model.  The  tax  rate  (t~),  sufficient  to  keep  the  level  of  real 
parameter values chosen are :  government debt per capita constant. Table 1 presents 
the results for our small open economy. The constant 
7=0.25  a~  =0.9  az=0.5  /3=0.015  debt  policy  does  not  introduce  intergenerational 
v =  0.015  /max =  1.0  ~ =  0  incomc  effects.  Still,  the  tax  reform  is  not  ncutral 
between  generations.  For  individual  households,  a 
a~. =  0.5.02  at =  0.8  an =  0.5  6 o =  0.045  proportional consumption tax is equivalent to a wage 
6~  =  0.003  c~ =  10.0  ~: =-2.0  tax  plus  a  lump  sum  tax  on  existing  assets.  Thc 
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Table 1. Effects of a  1% decrease in the rate of wage income taxation, financed by an increase in indirect taxes to keep real government  debt 
per capita at a constant level. 
Year 
Endogenous 
variable*  I  2  3  4  5  10  30  60 
t, (A%)  1.73  1.62  1.60  1.59  1.58  1.52  1.40  1.32  1.27 
b (A%)  0.03  -0.02  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00 
c 1 ( % )  -0.26  -0.19  -0.18  -0.16  -0.14  -0.07  0.10  0.22  0.32 
c 2 (%)  -0.31  -0.25  -0.23  -0.21  -0.20  -0.13  0.06  0.22  0.34 
I l  (%)  0.13  0.14  0.14  0.15  0.15  0.16  0.13  0.08  0.04 
12  (%)  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.07  0.07  0.08 
e ( % )  0.20  0.21  0.21  0.22  0.23  0.24  0.15  0.02  -  0.09 
Yl  (%)  0.05  0.08  0.09  0.10  0.11  0.14  0.13  0.08  0.04 
L~(%)  0.16  0.18  0.18  0.18  0.19  0.18  0.14  0.08  0.03 
k (%)  0.00  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.06  0.09  0.12  0.08  0.05 
m ( % )  0.01  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.06  0.10  0.08  0.08  0.08 
Pt  (%)  -0.10  -0.10  -0.11  -0.11  -0.11  -0.12  -0.08  -0.01  0.04 
p~ ( % )  -  0.29  -  0.30  -  0.30  -  0.29  -  0.28  -  0.25  -  0.13  -  0.01  0.09 
A, I% )  -0.10  -0.21  -0.31  -0.40  -0.50  -0.99  -2.72  -4.21  -  5.41 
V ( % )  0.02  0.06  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.04  0.05  0.09  0.08 
CV  b (%)  -0.006  -0.009  -0.011  -0.013  -0.015  -0.023  -0.048  -0.067  -0.081 
C V" ( % )  -  0.001  0.003  0.008  0.013  0.018  0.044  0.146 
• A% =  percentage point changes; %  =  percentage increase in lifetime  resources needed  (CV); percentage increase in benchmark value in 
other cases. 
b For this entry, the time index corresponds to the year in which the household was born. 
' For this entry, the time index corresponds to one minus the year in which the household was born. 
balanced budget reduction in the wage tax  therefore  original  levels  of utility,  of new  born  and  existing 
places a lump sum burden on older generations, while  generations respectively, expressed as a percentage of 
younger generations profit,  lifetime resources. An intergenerational redistribution 
The  income  effect  of  the  tax  change  decreases  effect is apparent, but the compensating transfers are 
consumption  of  both  goods  and  leisure  of  older  only a small fraction of lifetime resources. The present 
generations.  For  new  born  generations  the  income  value of these  transfers  is  slightly positive  (0.3%  of 
effect of the transfer tends to raise consumption and  GNP), indicating a net welfare loss. This suggests that 
lower labour supply.  Since the consumption tax  has  the  efficiency  gains  are  dominated  by  the  loss  of 
a broader base, after tax wages will shift by more than  consumer surplus. 
consumer  prices,  which  will  induce  a  substitution  The existence of such a surplus is a consequence of 
effect towards  increased  labour  supply  for  younger  the  heterogeneity  of  domestic  and  foreign  goods, 
generations as well. The result is an increase in overall  which is confirmed by the moderate price elasticities 
labour supply, which depresses real wages and raises  found in empirical studies of export demand. We can 
capital productivity. Both investment and production  calculate  the  size  of this  rent  fairly easily.  Because 
therefore increase.  The growth  of product supply  is  foreign  income  does  not  enter  the  export  demand 
not matched by an increase in domestic demand and  equation, 3  the  compensating  income  variation  for 
it therefore leads to a surplus on the current account  foreigners  can  be  calculated  directly  from  the 
and  a  deterioration of the  terms  of trade  (Pt).  The  Marshallian  consumer surplus  (for the general case, 
accumulation of claims against  foreigners during the  see Vartia [23]). Denote the export demand function 
transition  period  must  necessarily  bring  about  an  (Equation (73)) as e(pl ). The income transfer at time 
increase of domestic consumption that creates a deficit  t, implicit in changing  the domestic price level from 
on the trade balance in later years which causes the  ptx~(t ) to p~2~(t), is 
terms of trade to sway back. The intertemporal trade 
which results from the increase in net domestic savings,  C Ve(t ) =  -  e (p~) dp~ 
brings a welfare gain to foreigners, because domestic  '," 
households as a whole sacrifice part of their consumer 
surplus as a result of the initial increase in net exports.  =  _  1  (pt12~  e (p~21) _  p~tj e (p]t~)) 
This transfer abroad implies that the switch is not  1 - 
necessarily welfare improving for the home country, 
as it would  be for a  closed economy (see Auerbach 
and Kotlikoff [ 3 ] ). The last two rows of Table 1 show  3  The implicit assumption is that variations in the domestic price 
the compensating variations necessary to restore the  level have a  negligible income effect  for foreign consumers. Taxation in an intertemporal #eneral equilibrium model o/a  small open econom v:  D.P.  Broer and E. H "..~1.7.  H e.wcrtumt 
Table 2. Effects  of a  2  percentage  point decrease in the rate of interest  income  taxation,  financed  by an  increase in  indirect  taxes  to keep real 
government  debt per capita  at a constant  level.  ~ 
Year 
Endogenous 
variable  I  2  3  4  5  10  30  60  ~, 
t~  (A%)  -  15.44  0.95  0.95  0.94  0.94  0.91  0.76  0.59  0.45 
b  (A%)  0.06  10.83  10.80  10.78  10.75  10.68  10.57  10.53  10.50 
cl  (%)  7.69  -0.87  -0.89  -0.90  -0.90  -0.87  --0.57  -0.25  0.00 
c2  [ %  )  7.59  -  1.01  -  1.00  -0.99  -0.97  -0.86  -  0.38  0.05  0.38 
1 ~ ( %  )  -  0.49  -  0.28  -  0.32  -  0.35  -  0.38  -  0.51  -  0.78  -  0.95  -  1.08 
12  1% )  -  0.64  -  0.50  -  0.50  -  0.49  -  I).49  -  0.49  -  0.48  0.47  0.48 
e  ( %  )  0.37  0.54  0.44  0.35  0.27  -. 0.07  -  0.75  -  I. 19  -  1.50 
y~  ( %  I  2.47  0.08  0.01  -  0.05  -0.11  -0.33  -0.70  -0.90  -  1.03 
La {% )  3.56  -0.01  -0.03  -0.06  -0.09  -0.20  0.50  0.71  0.86 
k  ( %  )  0.00  -  0.08  -  0.17  -  0.24  -  0.30  -  0.53  -  0.86  -  I .(~)  -  1.09 
m  ( %  ~  1.68  -  0.26  -  0.28  -  0.29  -  0.31  -  0.36  -  0.42  -- 0.43  -  0.44 
p~  1%1  -0.18  -0.27  -0.22  -0.18  -0.13  0.03  0.38  0.59  0.75 
p~  ( %  )  -- 3.69  -  0.45  -  0.43  - 0.41  -  0.39  -  0.26  0.19  0.55  0.81 
A,.  ( %  )  0.18  1.5(1  1.01  0.54  0.08  -  1.98  -  7.90  -  12.46  16.(19 
V  ( %  )  -  0.14  -- 9.12  -  9.08  -  9.04  -- 9.00  -  8.85  -  8.59  -  8.45  -  8.33 
C V"  ( %  )  0.007  0.049  0.046  0.043  0.040  0.024  - 0.037  - 0.088  -  0.129 
('1/~  (%)  0.003  -0.001  --0.006  -0.009  -0.013  -0.031  -0.074 
aA%  =  Percentage  point changes;  %  =  percentage  increa~  in  lifetime resources  needed  (CV):  percentage  increase  in  benchmark  value in 
other cases. 
b For  this entry,  the  time index corresponds  to  the year  in  which  the  household  was  born. 
For  this entry,  the  time index corresponds  to  one  minus  the year  in  which  the  household  was  born. 
Note  that  for  p~<  p~2~, the  surplus  is  necessarily  development  are  different  from  those  of  a  closed 
negative. It tends to zero for e ---, oo. The total transfer  economy.  In  this  respect,  the  treatment  of capital 
is  income before taxes  is  of importance as well.  Under 
the residence principle, the tax rate of the country of 
~  residence of the investor determines the effective tax 
CV¢  CV~(t)  2,  11  (1  rs) -1  + 
rate, whereas  under the source principle the country 
,=0  .,=0  where the income is generated is decisive. Generally, 
which  equals  1.5%  of  GNP  in  the  case  at  hand.  for income from interest and dividends the residence 
Apparently,  this  is  larger  than  the  efficiency  gain  principle  applies  and  for  profit  income  the  source 
obtained from switching to a  broader tax base.  principle. In our model the source principle does not 
play any role, because, like most authors, we exclude 
Capital income  taxation  foreign investment in equity. 
Capital income taxation can take several forms in our  We  present  the  results  of  a  2  percentage  point 
model.  We  distinguish  interest  income,  dividend  decrease in  the  interest  income  tax  rate  in  Tables  2 
income, and  corporate profits as  possible  tax  bases,  and  3.  In  Table  2,  the  tax  change  is  effected  as  a 
These  sources  of income  are  all  treated  separately  balanced budget reform. The decrease in the interest 
under  Dutch  tax  laws,  and  from a  theoretical  point  income  tax  rate  implies  an  increase  in  the  desired 
of  view  their  distortionary  impact  may  differ  leverage  ratio  of firms,  as  the  gap  between  the  net 
considerably. In particular, the conclusions obtained  required  return  to  capital  and  the  net  costs  of debt 
by Summers and Auerbach and  Kotlikoff concerning  grows. Firms will therefore immediately increase their 
the  negative welfare effects of savings  taxation  need  amount of debt and distribute their excess cash  flow 
to  be  reaffirmed  for  corporate  income  taxes.  We  to shareholders  in  the form of dividends.  This leads 
present  the  consequences  of a  switch  from  each  of  to a  substantial  increase  in  dividend  tax  receipts  in 
these tax bases to consumption taxation in turn.  the  first  period,  which  allows  the  government  to 
decrease the consumption tax  rate  by  15  percentage 
Interest  income  taxation.  Interest  income  taxation  points. In the second year dividends return to a normal 
represents the classical distortion between consumption  level and the consumption tax increases to maintain a 
in  different periods.  In an open economy, where the  constant deficit. This fluctuation in taxes causes strong 
rate  of  interest  is  determined  internationally,  the  intertemporal substitution  effects in  consumption  in 
channels through which this tax influences economic  period 1, that initially somewhat obscure the increase Taxation in an intertemporal general equilibrium model of a  small open economy:  D.P.  Broer and E. W.M.T.  Westerhout 
Table 3. Effects of a  2  percentage  point decrease  in the rate of interest  income taxation, financed by a  uniform increase  in indirect  taxes to 
create a constant equilibrium level of government debt per capita." 
Year 
Endogenous 
variable  1  2  3  4  5  l0  30  60 
tc (A%)  0.37  0.37  0.37  0.37  0.37  0.37  0.37  0.37  0.37 
b {A% )  0.12  10.79  10.77  10.75  10.74  10.67  10.58  10.53  10.50 
ci (%)  -0.70  -0.69  -0.68  -0.67  -0.66  -0.61  -0.33  -0.08  0.07 
c z (%)  -0.87  -0.84  --0.81  -0.78  -0.76  -0.62  -0.15  0.22  0.45 
I~  (%)  -0.12  -0,11  --0.15  -0.18  -0.22  -0.35  -0.69  -0.92  -  1.07 
12 (%)  -0.40  -0,36  -0.36  -0.36  -0.36  -0.37  -0.41  -0.44  -0.46 
e  ( % )  0.70  0,62  0.53  0.44  0.36  0.04  -0.70  -  1.21  -  1.52 
y~  (%)  0.24  0.19  0.13  0.08  0.02  -0.18  -0.59  -0.86  -  1.02 
L~ ( % )  0.24  0.22  O. 18  O. 15  O. 12  -  0.02  -  0.40  -  0.68  -  0.85 
k  ( % )  0.00  -0.03  -0.10  -  0.15  -0.21  -0.40  -0.75  -0.96  -  1.08 
m (%)  -0.14  -0.14  -0.16  -0.17  -0.18  -0.24  -0.34  -0.40  -0.44 
p~  (%)  -0.35  -0.31  -0.26  -0.22  -0.18  -0.02  0.35  0.60  0.76 
p~ ( % )  -0.72  -0.67  -0.64  -0.60  -0.56  -0.40  0.15  0.57  0.84 
A, (%)  -0.36  -0.88  -  1.38  -  1.85  -2.31  -4.38  -  10.23  -  14.52  -17.33 
V ( % )  -  0.61  -  8.95  -  8.92  -  8.89  -  8.86  -  8.74  -  8.51  -  8.39  -  8.32 
D  (%)  -0.35  -4.10  -3.97  -  3.85  -3.73  -  3.20  -  1.66  -0.57  0.13 
CV  b (%)  -0.002  -0.004  -  0.007  -0.010  -0.013  -0.027  -0.073  -0.109  -0.132 
CV  c (%)  -0.005  -0.008  -0.010  -0.013  -0.015  -0.025  -0.012 
• A% =  percentage point changes; %  =  percentage increase in lifetime resources needed (CV); percentage increase in benchmark value in 
other cases. 
b For this entry, the time index corresponds to the year in which the household was born. 
For this entry, the time index corresponds to one minus the year in which the household was born. 
in the propensity to save. The lower interest income  increases  by 16.3 thousand million guilders equal to 
tax  implies  a  higher  net  return  on  savings  for  4.8% of GNPin the base year. It is evident, however, 
households,  which  leads  to  a  postponement  of  from the fluctuations in the consumption tax rate that 
consumption.  From  period  2  onwards,  savings  do  the  tax  policy  of  the  government  induces  new 
indeed increase.  This does not cause a fall in the rate  intertemporal distortions in consumption that might 
of interest, as it would in a closed economy, but rather  be avoided by smoothing consumption tax changes. 
an  accumulation of foreign  assets.  The  increase  in  We  present  the  consequences  of  a  once  only 
savings is also reflected  in an increase in net exports,  adaptation of this tax rate in Table 3.  The effect of 
In period 1, labour supply rises sharply as a result of  this  restriction  on  tax  changes  is  that  government 
intratemporalsubstituion,  which raises production. In  debt  is  no  longer  constant  during  the  transition. 
later  periods  labour  supply  falls,  but  net  exports  Even  though  this  implies  some  intergenerational 
remain high initially because domestic consumption  redistribution  through  the  government budget,  the 
falls sharply. In the longer run net exports fall again,  compensating variations resulting from this reform are 
as households start to consume their assets,  and the  negative for all generations born after t =  -35, with 
terms of trade improve. The increase in savings thus  a  total  present  value  of  -18.3  thousand  million 
leads to a net export of capital instead of depressing  guilders.  The tax smoothed reform therefore delivers 
interest rates. In this way households profit from the  higher welfare  gains than the  constant debt  policy. 
higher  return  to  savings  abroad  by  entering  into  Medium- and long-run effects for this tax change are 
intertemporal trade. The lower capital income tax rate  similar to that of the balanced budget change, with 
increases  the  required  rate  of  return  to  capital,  as notable differences  the response of labour supply, 
however,  which  lowers  the  desired  capital  stock,  which remains positive for more periods, and foreign 
Domestic  asset  accumulation  therefore  occurs  ex-  debt, which starts to decline immediately. Both effects 
clusively in terms of foreign assets,  reflect  the  income  effect  of  the  additional  burden 
Welfare  gains  accrue  both  to  older  generations,  placed on existing generations as a result of the initial 
which  experience  an  increase  in  the  value  of their  reduction in government debt.  All except the eldest 
assets,  and  to  generations born  after t =  18,  which  generations  profit,  however,  from  the  reduction  in 
profit from the reduction in foreign debt. Generations  intertemporal distortions. 
in between pay for the transition in terms of higher  The results of a  reduction in interest taxes in this 
consumption  taxes.  Total  welfare,  measured  as  model  therefore  deviate  from  those  of  a  closed 
(minus) the present value ofcompensating variations,  economy  model  as  presented  by  Auerbach  and 
l~Paf~Taf'~!tktllll'r  ~  ~21[If"~ll'tl'~lb'NI;~l  •  IgTP  •  ........  tNt'~t,~  ,"p-~ Taxation  #t an  interlemporal ~qeneral equilibrium  model o/a .~mall open econom v:  D.P.  Broer and E. l! ". 11. T.  11 'c.~terhout 
Table 4. Effects of a  5  percentage  point decrease in the rate of dividend  income taxation,  financed  by an increase in indirect  taxes  to keep real 
government  debt per capita at a  constant  level." 
Year 
Endogenous 
variable  1  2  3  4  5  10  30  60  s: 
t~ (A%)  -0.11  0.14  0.18  0.21  0.25  0.39  0.73  0.95  1.09 
b ( A % )  -  11.10  0.05  0.04  0.03  0.02  -  0.01  -  0.03  -  0.01  0.0 I 
c~  (%)  0.71  0.55  0.50  11.45  0.41  0.21  -027  -0.63  -0.87 
c2  1% )  0.85  0.70  0.65  0.61  0.57  0.38  -0.17  -0.61  -0.93 
I~  ( % J  -0.38  --0.40  -0.41  -0.42  -0.43  -0.45  -0.37  -0.23  --0.11 
12  (%)  -0.16  -0.16  -0.17  -0.17  -0.17  -0.18  -0.20  -0.21  0.21 
e ( % )  -0.55  -0.58  -0.611  -0.62  -0.64  -0.66  -0.42  -0.05  0.24 
)'~  (%)  -0.15  -0.22  -0.25  -0.28  --0.30  -0.38  -  0.37  -0.23  -  0.11 
L,~ ( % )  -0.46  -0.51  -0.52  -0.52  -0.52  -0.52  -0.411  -0.22  -0.08 
k {%)  0.00  -0.05  -0.09  -0.13  -0.16  -0.26  -0.33  -0.24  -11.15 
m (%)  -0.04  -0.08  -0.09  -0.10  -0.12  -0.16  -0.21  -0.22  -0.21 
p~  ( % )  0.28  0.29  0.30  0.31  0.32  0.33  0.21  0.03  - 0.12 
Pt  ( % )  0.82  0.84  0.83  0.81  0.79  0.71  0.36  0.02  -  0.23 
.4~ (%)  0.32  0.61  0.88  1.15  1.42  2.77  7.26  10.90  13.58 
V ~  % }  6.50  6.39  6.40  6.41  6.42  6.44  6.39  6.29  6.19 
C V  b ( % )  0.014  0.021  0.026  0.031  0.036  0.059  11.122  0.170  0.206 
CV  ~ ( % )  0.002  -0.010  -0.022  -0.035  -0.048  -0.116  --0.382 
~A%  =  percentage point changes; %  =  percentage increase in lifetime  resources needed  (CV): percentage increase in  benchmark  value in 
other cases. 
t, For this entry, the time index corresponds to the year in which the household was born. 
For this entry, the time index corresponds to one minus the year in which the household was born. 
Kotlikoff [2],  even  though  the  welfare  effects  are  net exports that raises the terms of trade. In time, the 
similar. In their model, a  switch from capital income  intertemporal  trade  necessary to satisfy the external 
taxation to consumption taxation leads to an increase  budget  restriction (Equation  (75)), brings down the 
in capital formation via a decrease in the interest rate  terms of trade again. Welfare effects of this policy are 
caused by the larger supply of savings.  In our model  positive, however, with a present value of compensating 
this  is  prevented  by  interest  arbitrage  through  transfers  of  I%  of initial  GNP  as  a  result  of the 
international capital flowsand instead we find a strong  additional  creaming  off  of  the  foreign  consumer 
improvement of the current account. The extra savings  surplus by the private sector. The present value of this 
are  invested  abroad  and  their  return  is  consumed  change  in  surplus  is  4.2%  of GNP.  This  presents 
mostly in terms of leisure. The trade balance therefore  another instance of a reversal of welfare effects caused 
deteriorates  in  later  years,  balancing  the  additional  by product differentiation in foreign trade, just  as in 
factor income from abroad,  the shift from wage taxation to consumption taxation 
analysed before. Some additional welfare gains result 
Dividend income taxation.  Dividend income taxation,  if the consumption tax rate is smoothed over time, but 
although similar to an interest tax from the household  qualitative results are very similar. 
point of view, has completely different implications for 
savings. Its main effect is to decrease the market value  Corporate  income  taxation.  The  last  tax  to  be 
of dividend payments, which acts as a  lump sum tax  considered  is  the  corporate  income  tax.  The  usual 
on existing shareholders, while leaving future rates of  argument  in  favour  of  a  reduction  in  corporate 
return on assets unaffected. Only if firms are required  taxation  is  that  it  fosters  investment.  To  the  extent 
to  maintain  a  constant  pay  out  ratio  may dividend  that  this argument depends on an encouragement of 
taxes influence capital costs (see above). The results of  domestic savings, it is of doubtful validity for a small 
a 5 percentage point decrease in the dividend tax rate,  open  economy, as  we  have  shown  above.  There  is, 
compensated  for  by  a  balanced  budget  increase  in  however,  another  important  aspect  of  corporate 
consumption  taxes,  are  presented  in  Table  4.  The  taxation  in  relation  to  the  choice  of  financing  of 
market  value  of the  firm  at  once  rises  by  6.5%  in  investment. High corporate tax rates encourage debt 
reaction to the change, which presents a windfall profit  financing of investment expenditures, as the after tax 
to the elderly. Consumption of both goods and leisure  costs of debt decrease with rising corporate tax rates, 
therefore increases and investment falls as a  result of  in view of the deductibility of interest payments. This 
the concomitant decrease in capital productivity. The  increased leverage carries a social cost, as pointed out 
result is a general decline in activity and a decrease in  above, in the form of an overaccumulation of capital Taxation  in an intertemporal  .qeneral  equilibrium  model of a small open economy:  D.P.  Broer and E. W. M.T.  Westerhout 
Table 5. Effect  of a  3 percentage point decrease in the corporate tax rate, financed by a  uniform  increase in indirect taxes to create a constant 
equilibrium  level of government debt per capita." 
Year 
Endogenous 
variable  I  2  3  4  5  10  30  60  ~c 
t, (A%)  -0.08  -0.08  -0.08  -0.08  -0.08  -0.08  -0.08  -0.08  -0.08 
b (  A% )  - 0.02  -  1.64  -  3.26  - 4.89  - 6.52  -  14.74  -  17.58  -  17.57  -  17.56 
c I ( % )  0.59  0.53  0.48  0.44  0.40  0.32  0.23  O. 11  0.04 
c2 ( % )  0.62  0.60  0.58  0.56  0.54  0.48  0.27  0.09  - 0.02 
I l (%)  -0.85  -0.84  -0.83  -0.80  -0.77  -0.61  -0.42  -0.31  -0.24 
12 (%)  -0.80  -0.73  -0.67  -0.60  -0.55  -0.36  -0.35  -0.33  -0.32 
e (%)  -0.12  -0.28  -0.40  -0.49  -0.56  -0.63  -0.19  0.06  0.21 
Y~ (%)  0.08  -0.05  -0.14  -0.22  -0.28  -0.34  -0.07  0.06  0.14 
L,s 1% )  -0.45  -0.47  -0.47  -0.47  -0.47  -0.41  -0.22  -0.08  0.00 
k (%)  0.00  -0.13  -0.23  -0.30  -0.36  -0.39  -0.14  -0.03  0.03 
m (%)  -0.19  -0.20  -0.21  -0.21  -0.20  -0.17  -0.11  -0.08  -0.06 
Pl (%)  0.06  0.14  0.20  0.25  0.28  0.32  0.10  -0.03  -0.10 
Pa ( % )  0.52  0.52  0.51  0.51  0.50  0.46  0.21  0.00  -0.12 
A, (%)  0.05  -0.02  -0.04  -0.01  0.06  0.84  3.60  5.37  6.40 
V ( % )  4.64  5.71  6.77  7.84  8.91  14.24  16.01  15.98  15.95 
D ( % )  0.06  0.58  1.10  1.62  2.14  4.75  5.05  4.55  4.25 
CV  t' (%)  -0.058  -0.056  -0.054  -0.053  -0.052  -0.046  -0.027  -0.011  -0.002 
CV  c (%)  -0.067  -0.076  -0.085  -0.094  -0.103  -0.151  -0.320 
' A% = percentage point changes;  % = percentage increase in lifetime resources needed (CV); percentage increase in benchmark  values in 
other cases. 
h For this entry, the time index corresponds  to the year in which the household was born. 
For this entry, the time index corresponds to one minus the year in which the household  was born. 
and  an  increased  percentage  of  bankruptcies  and  while maintaining a  sustainable steady-state debt per 
capital depreciation,  capita. 
The effects of a  3  percentage point decrease in the  The net result is thus a  lowering of both  tax rates, 
corporate tax rate, financed by a once only adjustment  and  welfare  gains  are  bound  to  be  substantial.  The 
of  indirect  taxes,  are  presented  in  Table  5.  An  present  value  of compensating  transfers  amounts  to 
immediate consequence of the tax change is an increase  12%  of GNP,  which  is to be attributed in large part 
in the market value of the firm. This presents a capital  to  the  reduction  in  agency costs  following from  the 
gain  to  existing  shareholders,  which  stimulates  change in the financial structure of firms. Still, 20% of 
consumption  of both  goods  and  leisure.  As  a  result  the beneficial effect is due  to terms of trade changes, 
labour supply decreases and the marginal productivity  resulting from  the withdrawal of labour supply. 
of capital falls. A second consequence of the tax change  Even though the reduction in the depreciation rate 
is  that  the  cost  of  debt  rises  and  the  desired  that causes these efficiency gains is rather modest, the 
debt-capital  ratio  falls.  The  desired decrease  in  the  beneficial effects of the corporate tax adjustment may 
debt ratio is 17 percentage points, so that the change  be overstated.  We consider two  modifications of the 
in  financial  structure  cannot  be  paid  for  out  of the  model to investigate its sensitivity in this respect. First, 
current cashflow. Instead the firmwithholdsdividend  under  the  old  view  of  dividend  payments,  it  is 
payments  for  11  years,  to  reach  the  new  financial  unrealistic to assume that firms can actually withhold 
optimum.  During this transition, the cost of funds is  dividend payments for a  prolonged period, when they 
higher  and  investment  is  cut  down.  The  increase  in  are in fact making a  profit. This point is taken up in 
the cost of funds is, however, insufficient to induce the  Table  6,  which  presents  the  results  of a  cut  of the 
firm to issue new shares. From period 12 on, dividend  corporate  tax  rate, financed  by a  once  only increase 
payments  are  restored.  Capital  costs  are  now  lower  in  the  consumption  tax  rate,  in  case  of a  minimum 
than  in  the  benchmark  case  as  a  result  of  dividend pay out ofx =  50%  • Because of the pay out 
the smaller debt ratio, which lowers the depreciation  restriction, the initial drop in dividend taxes does not 
rate by 0.04 percentage points, and the capital stock is  occur in this case. Short- and medium-term effects are 
gradually restored to its benchmark level. The amount  very similar to the previous case. The transfer to older 
of investment  needed  to  sustain  this  capital stock  is  generations  again  causes  consumption  to  rise  and 
lower, though,  so  that  consumption  possibilities are  labour supply to fall. This decreases capital productivity 
larger, as is the taxable base of corporate income. This  and  investment.  In this case, however, the restriction 
allows the government to lower the consumption tax,  on dividend pay outs distorts capital costs even in the 
IU~f'~dr-~L~Tf'li~A[T~ TtLAKdU~LInLIU~W  •  ]K~T~  •  ........  I  d'~'~  ~ Taxation  in an intertemporal  ,qeneral  equilibrium  model O~ a small open ecommT.v.  D.P.  Broer attd E. H'.M.I.  We,~tertumt 
Table 6. Effects of a 3 percentage point decrease in the corporate tax rate in case of a required minimum dividend pay out ratio of 50%, financed 
by a  uniform  increase in indirect  taxes to create a  constant equilibrium  level of government  debt per capita. 
Year 
Endogenous 
variable  i  2  3  4  5  10  .t4)  60 
t~ (A% l  0.39  0.39  0.39  0.39  0.39  0.39  0.39  0.39  0.39 
b  (A%)  -  0.09  -  0.22  -  0.35  -  0.48  -  0.60  -  I. 16  -  3.02  -  5.07  -8.77 
c I  ( %  )  0.68  0.61  0.55  0.50  0.44  0.24  --0.18  -0.43  -  0.50 
c 2 ( %  )  0.81  0.77  0.73  0.69  0.65  0.49  0.01  -- 0.38  0.55 
11  (%)  -0.88  -0.92  -0.95  -0.98  -  1.00  -  1.04  -0.88  -0.60  -0.40 
12  ( %  )  -0.69  -0.68  -0.67  -0.66  -0.66  -0.63  -0.57  -0.52  -0.47 
e  (%)  -0.49  -0.60  -0.70  0.78  -0.85  -  1.02  -[).77  -0.21  0.18 
y~  {% )  -0.13  -0.23  -0.32  -0.39  -0.45  -0.64  -  0.60  -  0.30  -0.05 
La (%)  -0.77  -0.79  -0.80  -0.80  -0.81  -0.79  -0.53  -0.22  -0.04 
k  ( %  )  0.00  -0.13  -0.24  -0.33  -0.41  -0.68  -I).76  -0.51  -0.26 
m  (%)  -0.22  -0.25  -0.27  -0.29  -0.31  -0.36  -0.36  -0.29  -0.21 
p~  ( %  )  0.25  0.30  0.35  0.39  0.42  0.51  0.38  0.10  -0.09 
Pl (%)  1.08  1.05  1.02  0.99  0.97  0.82  0.31  -0.14  -0.34 
A,, {%)  0.37  0.47  0.59  0.74  0.91  1.97  6.57  10.31  11.43 
V (%)  8.64  8.74  8.83  8.91  8.99  9.35  10.31  11.21  12.59 
D  ( %  )  0.25  -  0.23  -  0.73  -  1.27  -  1.84  -  4.97  -  16.55  -  24.90  -  22.03 
C V h ( %  )  -  0.002  0.003  0.008  0.012  0.016  0.035  0.081  0.108  0. I 12 
CV"  (%)  -0.018  -0.034  -0.051  -0.067  -0.084  -0.172  -0.505 
A%  =  percentage point changes;  %  =  percentage increase in  lifetime resources  needed  (CV):  percentage increase in  benchmark  value in 
other cases. 
t, For this entry,  the time index corresponds  to the year in which the household  was born. 
For this entry,  the time index corresponds  to one minus the year in which the household  was born. 
long  run,  as  the  firm  cannot  achieve  its  optimal  off.  Agency  costs  are  therefore  by  far  the  most 
financial structure. This has a negative long-term effect  important determinant of the favourable consequences 
on capital formation. The tax base of the government  of corporate tax reductions. 
is also negatively affected by this inefficiency, and here 
the consumption tax  rate has  to increase to balance  Conclusion 
the  steady-state  budget.  Because  efficiency  gains 
are  largely  absent,  the  consequences  of  the  inter-  In this paper we consider the consequences for a small 
generational transfer are more predominant, and the  open  economy  of switching  from  various  forms  of 
initial stimulus to consumption creates a deficit on the  income taxation to consumption taxation. The paper 
current account, that  leads  to terms of trade effects,  emphasizes  the  role  of  the  terms  of  trade  in  the 
Thus  initial  consumption  increases  even  more,  and  allocation  of  production  and  the  distribution  of 
later generations suffer. This is partially compensated  welfare gains of tax reforms between the home country 
for by a  decline in government debt, which implies a  and the foreign country. It is shown that the terms of 
transfer to new generations. Compensating variations  trade effect may well dominate the pure efficiency gain 
would still have to go the new born, however, while  of a  tax  reform for the  home country.  In  case  of a 
the total welfare improvement drops to 8% of GNP.  switch from wage taxation to consumption taxation, 
Second, the assumed externality in capital formation  this leads to a small negative welfare effect, despite the 
may obscure the intrinsic efficiency gains or losses of  broader  tax  base.  Similarly,  the  effects of the  lump 
the change of tax  base.  To judge this effect, we also  sum  transfer to existing stockholders that  is  implied 
computed  the effects of this  tax  change  in  case of a  by a  switch  from dividend  taxation  to consumption 
fixed debt ratio, equal to the initial steady-state value  taxation are dominated by the positive welfare gains 
(see  Table  7).  This  case  is  very  similar  to  the  of the  terms  of trade  improvement.  A  reduction  in 
dividend  tax  reduction  analysed  previously.  The  interest  income taxes  is  also  welfare improving;  but 
primary effect is  a  transfer  to  older generations,  by  unlike the case of a closed economy it does not foster 
means  of a  capital  gain  on  the  market  value of the  investment,  as  the  extra  savings  resulting  from  this 
firm.  This  stimulates  consumption  and  reduces  measure are invested abroad. Substantial welfare gains 
production  and  capital  formation.  Terms  of  trade  are indicated by the model following a lowering of the 
effects cause a transfer to welfare from abroad (3% of  corporate tax  rate, as a  result  of a  reduction  in  the 
initial GNP), so that the total welfare effect is positive,  externality associated  with  the  agency costs  of debt 
at  1% of GNP, even though the new born are worse  financing. In the absence of agency costs, a reduction Taxation  in an intertemporal general equilibrium model of a small open economy." D.P.  Broer and E. W. M.T.  Westerhout 
Table 7. Effect  of a  3  percentage  point decrease in the corporate tax rate in case of a  fixed debt-capita  ratio, financed  by a  uniform  increase 
in indirect  taxes to create a  constant equilibrium  level of government debt per capita. ° 
Year 
Endogenous 
variable  1  2  3  4  5  I0  30  60 
t  c (A%)  0.46  0.46  0.46  0.46  0.46  0.46  0.46  0.46  0.46 
c I (%)  0.18  0.16  0.13  0.11  0.09  0.01  -0.18  -0.30  -0.38 
c 2 (%)  0.26  0.24  0.22  0.21  0.19  0.12  -0.11  -0.29  -0.40 
I ~ ( % )  -  0.28  -  0.29  -  0.30  -  0.30  -  0.31  -  0.32  -  0.24  -  0.12  -  0.05 
12 (%)  -0.16  -0.15  -0.15  -0.15  -0.15  -0.15  -0.13  -0.10  -0.09 
e (%)  -0.31  -0.34  -0.36  -0.38  -0.40  -0.43  -0.28  -0.05  0.10 
y~  (%)  -0.15  -0.18  -0.20  -0.22  -0.24  -0.28  -0.25  -0.13  -0.05 
L a  ( %  )  -  0.40  -  0.40  -  0.40  -  0.40  -  0.40  -  0.38  -  0.26  -  0.1 2  -  0.03 
k (%)  0.00  -0.04  -0.07  -0.10  -0.12  -0.20  -0.22  -0.13  -0.07 
m 1%)  -0.10  -0.11  -0.11  -0.12  -0.12  -0.14  -0.14  -0.11  -0.09 
Pt  (%)  0.15  0.17  0.18  0.19  0.20  0.21  0.14  0.02  -0.05 
Pz ( % )  0.60  0.59  0.57  0.56  0.54  0.47  0.23  0.02  -  0.10 
A  e ( % )  0.15  0.24  0.33  0.43  0.53  I. 10  3.25  5.01  6.04 
V ( % )  4.32  4.29  4.30  4.31  4.31  4.33  4.32  4.27  4.25 
D ( % )  0.15  -  0.27  -  0.66  -  1.04  -  1.43  -  3.40  -  I 0.10  -  15.49  -  18.91 
C V  b ( % )  0.022  0.024  0.026  0.028  0.030  0.039  0.062  0.078  0.088 
CV  ~ (%)  0.015  0.007  -  0.000  -0.008  -0.016  -0.056  -0.213 
"A% = percentage point changes; % =  percentage increase  in lifetime resources  needed  (CV); percentage increase  in benchmark  value in 
other cases. 
b For this entry, the time index corresponds to the year in which  the household was born. 
' For this entry, the time index corresponds to one minus the year in which  the household was born. 
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